|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
No Way Out When the shuttle Columbia dissolved on re-entry Saturday morning, Feb. 1, it brought home to us all that space travel is risky business. There have been 113 missions and 17 years since the Challenger went down. We have all somehow taken the reliability and successes with a grain of salt. Saturday showed us that it really has been a fabulous feat for the shuttle launches to be so reliable. Unfortunately, reliability has also been something that NASA has begun to assume. The assumption that nothing would go wrong must have been part of the planning for this flight. The fact that something did go wrong at launch did not cause NASA to take any steps to attempt to fix it. What went wrong was that a piece of insulating foam had broken off one of the fuel tanks and hit the left wing of Columbia. This occurred at launch as Columbia was attempting to reach orbit. The potential problem was discovered a day after launch when NASA reviewed the launch videos. The insulating foam, which was as hard as a brick at the speed Columbia had reached, hit the left wing. The impact was recorded on a single frame of video. NASA officials said that they undertook an elaborate investigation to try to discover any damage the piece might have done. Although the agency did not say who convened to study the problem, they said that they concluded that the damage would be "insignificant." Not. I am sure that the final analysis will reveal that the foam colliding with the left wing will end up as the cause. NASA claims that they simulated the damage that could be caused, and did not find any need for alarm. Unfortunately they were wrong. Or did they realize that there would be no solution if the damage were "significant"? When I first heard the news, I thought, why didn't they check the damage in real time? NASA could call on powerful telescopes in Hawaii that could focus on the left wing and confirm the damage estimate. They didn't ask for this evaluation, even though Columbia had 14 more days in orbit to have it checked. Unfortunately, Columbia did not carry the 60-foot robotic arm, which would allow a camera to examine the left wing. The robotic arm had not been included in the inventory on board. Two of the astronauts were checked out for space walks, but only for minor maintenance. There was no tile-repair capability on board. NASA could have asked the International Space Station crew to check the left wing's integrity. It didn't. I thought that if they did discover threatening damage on the left wing, they might have been able to repair it by linking up with the International Space Station and keeping the shuttle attached while further simulations based on the damage assessment could be made. "Another Hubble," I thought. NASA sends up a repair crew in another shuttle and all are saved. This couldn't happen. It turns out that the shuttle orbit was not the same as the space station's, and there was not enough fuel aboard the Columbia to permit it to change orbit and join the space station. As a matter of fact, there was only about enough fuel for five more days. Also, Columbia was not designed to link up with the space station. It turns out that NASA was not ignoring the danger by not looking at the damage, they were avoiding having to admit that there was no way to fix it if it in fact had occurred. Ron D. Dittemore, the space shuttle's project manager, said "Early in the program, we recognized that if we lost a tile or multiple tiles, we didn't have any repair technique. We finally abandoned pursuing that. We just didn't believe it was feasible at the time." Dittemore also said later "There was zero we could have done about it." The NASA Gamble It appears that NASA simply gambled that the damage would not be deadly. They really had no choice. If the damage still allowed a safe landing, they could correct the problem on the next launch. If the problem destroyed the shuttle, they knew that there was no way this could be avoided. There was "No Way Out." Future Pressure The Challenger disaster grounded shuttle flights for over two years. That was before the International Space Station (ISS). Some say the ISS represents the reason for the shuttle and vice versa. Without the space station would we really need so many shuttle flights? Without the shuttle could we build a space station? The space station presently is only half constructedfour shuttle flights were schedule this year to ferry up components to add to the completion. Russia also is building some of the remaining items and has been very late because of finances. Presently the three astronauts aboard the station can leave with their emergency Soyuz vehicle, or return on the Soyuz scheduled to arrive with replacements in late April. Theoretically, they could close up the ISS at that time and wait as long as it takes for the shuttle refurbishing. Falling to Earth Unfortunately there is another problem. The space station is falling to earth, albeit slowly. The space station depends on shuttle visits to boost it back up. Typically the shuttle takes the space station about eight miles above the orbit it finds it in. Without this, the station would eventually fall into the atmosphere and suffer the fate of Columbia. Not to mention the end of NASA. This means that NASA must respond with a program that at least has shuttle flights to boost the space station's altitude when required. What's Next? NASA will have to defend itself with hearings and investigations. Some of the questions to be asked will likely be:
NASA will defend its decisions, and probably will set up guidelines, which will include the ability to repair tiles in space. Inspections will be made whenever a shuttle arrives at the ISS. Freon will be added to the bonding agent when putting on the foam. Tests will be made on the foam insulation's integrity, and possibly a skirt of some sort will wrap the fuel module. All this will allow the resumption of shuttle flights without too much delay. Certainly in time to boost the ISS orbit. Mars NASA's ultimate goal is to go to Mars. A number of the studies done on the shuttle are to evaluate man's living in space for prolonged periods. The distance of Mars from the Earth varies, depending where the Earth and Mars are in their respective orbits. The closest they come during opposition is about 35 million miles or 54.7 million kilometers. At 35 million miles, assuming travel at 25,000 miles an hour, a trip to Mars would take about two to three months. Of course, that would require a tremendous amount of fuel, so a longer orbit and a longer trip would be in order. The reality is that we are so ill-prepared to venture past our present capabilities and finances that the Mars goal is a bad dream. NASA now has a huge problem just replacing personnel. Over half the workers are over 60 years old. When they retire, the experience goes with them. NASA must rethink manned flight and concentrate on cheaper flights using robots. The window for man traveling to Mars is slowly closing for this decade. So what? Frank Greenhalgh About the Author Frank Greenhalgh has been working in power supplies and systems for 38 years. He has many impressive accomplishments and patents. Over the years he has made significant contributions to Trio Laboratories where he held the position of Chief Design Engineer and was then promoted to Vice President. He co-founded CEAG Electric Corporation (now ABB CEAG) and developed the first mainframe power system using the droop paralleling concept. He has written numerous articles and columns, presented papers at the milestone PowerCon convention, and consulted for ABB CEAG and other companies. Recently his accomplishments include the development of two Web sites, www.fgl.com with the Power Corner, and www.amityville.com. Frank is presently functioning as "Director of Technical Sales" for Toritsu Tsushin Kogoyo Corp.
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Copyright © 2003 ChipCenter-QuestLink About ChipCenter-Questlink |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||